

Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference: Albania and the Enlargement Context

Conference Report and Reflections

Tirana, Albania | 27 July 2026

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Foreword

Europe's security landscape is being reshaped not only by military aggression and geopolitical rivalry, but also by a quieter contest over information, public confidence and democratic choice. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) seeks to exploit division, distort public debate and weaken trust in the institutions on which democracy depends.

This is not simply a communications challenge. It is a challenge to democratic security.

Against this backdrop, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania convened the international conference *Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference: Albania and the Enlargement Context* in Tirana on 27 July 2026. The conference brought together policymakers, diplomats, experts, journalists, researchers and civil society representatives to examine how FIMI is evolving and how Europe can respond more effectively.

For Albania, the subject carries particular weight. As a NATO Ally and a candidate for membership of the European Union, we see democratic resilience as both a national responsibility and a shared European endeavour. The accession process strengthens the institutions of candidate countries. At the same time, their experience of confronting hybrid pressure can contribute to the security and resilience of Europe as a whole.

This was one of the clearest messages to emerge from the Tirana Conference: enlargement countries should not be viewed only as recipients of European standards and support. They are also partners with knowledge, experience and capabilities to offer.

The discussions also underlined that resilience cannot be built by governments alone. It depends on credible institutions, independent journalism, active civil society, academic expertise, responsible technology and citizens equipped to navigate an increasingly contested information environment. Above all, it depends on trust.

This report distils the principal ideas and recommendations that emerged in Tirana. It does not reproduce every intervention. Instead, it captures the common ground between different perspectives and translates it into a concise recommendation for action.

The threat will continue to evolve, accelerated by artificial intelligence and new technologies. Europe's response must therefore remain adaptive, cooperative and firmly anchored in

democratic values. Protecting democracy must never mean compromising openness, pluralism and freedom that give democracy its strength.

The Tirana Conference was a contribution to that wider European effort. I hope this report helps carry the conversation forward and supports stronger cooperation among EU institutions, Member States, and enlargement partners.

Ferit Hoxha

Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania

Executive Summary

On 27 July 2026, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania organized the international conference dedicated specifically to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). The conference examined FIMI as a security and democratic governance challenge, with particular attention to Albania and the wider EU enlargement context.

The discussions produced four principal conclusions.

First, FIMI is not merely the circulation of false or misleading content. It is the deliberate and coordinated manipulation of the information environment in pursuit of strategic objectives. Its targets are public trust, democratic institutions, electoral integrity and social cohesion.

Second, the response cannot be confined to fact-checking, platform regulation or government communication. Democratic resilience depends on an entire ecosystem: accountable institutions, independent media, civil society, research, education, technology companies and informed citizens.

Third, Europe must move from framework to implementation. The foundations are already in place through initiatives such as the European Democracy Shield, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience, international co-operation on disrupting FIMI actors and other cooperation mechanisms. The priority now is to strengthen implementation through deeper institutional coordination, operational cooperation, greater analytical capacity and the systematic involvement of candidate countries.

Fourth, enlargement is increasingly part of Europe's security response. Candidate countries, especially those bordering Russia, are already exposed to its sophisticated mix of information manipulation, cyber pressure, economic coercion, and proxy influence. Their frontline experience should be incorporated more systematically into initiatives such as the European Democracy Shield and related cooperation mechanisms.

The conference also considered the growing role of artificial intelligence. AI enables malicious actors to produce and disseminate manipulative content more rapidly, cheaply, and convincingly, but it does not create the political or institutional vulnerabilities they seek to exploit. Technology can amplify the threat, just as it can strengthen our capacity to detect, analyse, and counter it. The decisive factor remains the resilience of democratic societies.

The Tirana Conference therefore advanced a clear proposition: protecting the integrity of the information environment is inseparable from protecting democracy itself. Europe's response must be collective, long-term and open to the contribution of candidate countries.

Why FIMI Matters Now

Europe has entered an era in which information is increasingly used as an instrument of geopolitical power. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the proliferation of hybrid operations and the rapid development of artificial intelligence have altered both the scale of the threat and the speed at which it can spread.

The conference reflected a broad consensus that FIMI should no longer be treated as a specialist concern for communications teams. It affects national security, democratic governance and Europe's capacity to act collectively. Prime Minister Edi Rama and Minister Ferit Hoxha both placed the protection of public trust and democratic discourse within this wider security context.

Seen in this wider context, countering FIMI is part of protecting sovereignty itself: not only the integrity of state institutions, but also the ability of societies and citizens to form judgments and make democratic choices free from organised external manipulation.

The distinction between FIMI and ordinary misinformation is important. False information may be shared accidentally or arise spontaneously. FIMI involves intentional and coordinated efforts, often linked to foreign state or non-state actors, to shape perceptions, influence political choices or weaken democratic cohesion.

The techniques are not new. States have long sought to influence foreign publics and interfere in political life. What has changed is their reach. Digital platforms allow narratives to travel across borders within seconds. Automated networks can manufacture the appearance of public support. Artificial intelligence can generate persuasive text, images, audio and video at unprecedented speed and scale.

Yet the conference cautioned against viewing technology as the source of the problem. Influence operations succeed when they encounter existing weaknesses: low trust, social division, opaque institutions, fragile media markets or poor communication between governments and citizens. AI magnifies these vulnerabilities, but does not create them.

Modern interference is also rarely confined to online content. It may combine propaganda with cyber operations, financial influence, corruption, political proxies, diplomatic pressure and the

manipulation of local grievances. The objective is not always to persuade citizens of a particular claim. Often, it is enough to produce confusion, deepen cynicism or convince the public that no source can be trusted.

This explains why correcting individual falsehoods, while necessary, is insufficient. By the time a fabricated narrative has gained traction, much of the damage may already have been done. The more durable response is to reduce the vulnerabilities that manipulation exploits.

Europe has begun to develop a more comprehensive policy framework. The European Democracy Shield and the European Centre for Democratic Resilience reflect a shift from reactive communications towards institutional preparedness, coordinated analysis and broader democratic resilience. The challenge now is to ensure that these instruments translate into practical capabilities across Europe, including in candidate countries.

The conference identified public trust as the central battleground. FIMI targets the relationship between citizens and institutions, between voters and democratic processes, and between societies and the information on which public choices depend. Protecting that relationship requires transparent government, credible communication, professional journalism and citizens able to assess information critically.

The strategic objective, therefore, is not to create an information environment free from disagreement or falsehood. Such an environment would be neither possible nor democratic. It is to ensure that open societies can withstand manipulation without sacrificing freedom of expression, pluralism or political debate.

FIMI matters now because it exploits the very openness on which democracy rests. Europe's task is to protect that openness by making its institutions more trusted, its societies more informed and its democratic partnerships more resilient.

Enlargement as a Strategic Investment in European Resilience

A distinctive feature of the Tirana Conference was its decision to examine FIMI through the lens of EU enlargement. This reflected a wider strategic shift: candidate countries are not only preparing to join the Union, but are already part of Europe's security environment.

Many enlargement countries face sustained foreign influence, political pressure and contested information spaces. Their institutions, media and societies are often exposed early to methods that later appear elsewhere in Europe. This experience gives them practical knowledge that should be treated as a European asset, not merely as a national challenge.

The discussions drew attention to Moldova and Ukraine. Moldova's experience showed that resilience cannot be improvised during an election or political crisis. It must be built in advance through credible institutions, transparent governance, strategic communication and public confidence in democratic processes. Ukraine demonstrated that information manipulation forms part of a broader hybrid strategy, operating alongside military aggression, cyberattacks, diplomatic pressure and economic coercion.

These examples reinforced a central conclusion: FIMI should not be analysed in isolation. Its methods adapt to national circumstances, but the vulnerabilities it exploits are often shared. Weak coordination, low institutional trust, fragile media markets and political polarisation create opportunities that hostile actors can use across borders.

Candidate countries therefore have two roles. They must continue to strengthen their own democratic institutions, regulatory frameworks and public preparedness. At the same time, their experience should inform the development of European policy and operational practice.

This requires a more inclusive approach to Europe's emerging democratic resilience architecture. Candidate countries should be associated more closely with relevant EU initiatives, professional networks, analytical exchanges and training programmes. Cooperation should not begin only once membership is achieved. The threats already cross the Union's borders, and the response must do the same.

The conference also highlighted the importance of national context. Influence operations use local languages, grievances, personalities and political divisions. A common European framework is therefore essential, but it must be supported by strong local expertise. Effective responses depend on understanding how foreign narratives interact with domestic vulnerabilities and how coordinated behaviour moves between online and offline environments.

Albania's experience illustrated this point. Parliamentary oversight, independent journalism, professional fact-checking, academic research and cooperation among public institutions all contribute to resilience. None is sufficient alone. Together, they form the democratic infrastructure that makes manipulation more difficult and less effective.

The accession process itself can help strengthen this infrastructure. Reforms associated with the rule of law, media freedom, public administration, electoral integrity and institutional accountability all reduce the space in which foreign interference can operate. In this sense, democratic reform and security policy are increasingly inseparable.

The Tirana Conference therefore advanced a broader understanding of enlargement. It is not only a process of legal alignment and economic convergence. It is also an investment in Europe's democratic security.

For Albania, this means approaching accession not solely as preparation for membership, but as an opportunity to contribute. As a NATO Ally and an EU candidate country, Albania has both an interest and a responsibility to participate actively in Europe's response to hybrid threats.

European enlargement is often described in terms of what candidate countries gain from joining the Union. The discussions in Tirana also asked what Europe gains from their participation. In the field of democratic resilience, the answer is clear: experience, early warning, regional knowledge and a stronger collective capacity to act.

Turning Strategy into Capability

Over recent years, Europe has developed an increasingly comprehensive framework to counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. Through initiatives such as the EU FIMI Toolbox, as well as through growing cooperation among European institutions, Member States and specialised organisations, FIMI has become firmly established as a strategic security challenge rather than simply a communications issue.

The discussions in Tirana therefore began from a different premise. The question was no longer whether Europe had recognised the threat, but how existing policies, instruments and partnerships could be translated into stronger operational capability.

Participants agreed that the next phase of Europe's response should focus on implementation. Success will depend less on developing new concepts than on ensuring that existing mechanisms work together effectively, that institutions cooperate seamlessly and that resilience becomes an operational reality across the European democratic space.

A recurring theme throughout the conference was the importance of institutional coordination. Foreign information manipulation does not operate within administrative boundaries. It cuts across foreign policy, national security, cyber defence, electoral integrity, public communication and digital regulation. Democratic responses must therefore be equally integrated.

Rather than creating additional structures, participants emphasised the need to strengthen cooperation between those already in place. Effective implementation depends on timely

information-sharing, common situational awareness and clear coordination between governments, European institutions, researchers and practitioners. Operational resilience is built not through isolated initiatives, but through institutions capable of acting together.

The conference also highlighted the importance of turning analysis into action. Europe today possesses far greater knowledge of how influence operations are planned, conducted and adapted than it did only a few years ago. The challenge is to ensure that this knowledge informs policymaking, operational planning and institutional decision-making.

This requires sustained investment in analytical capacity, specialised expertise and professional training. Detecting influence operations is only the first step. Institutions must also be equipped to assess risks, coordinate responses and adapt rapidly as hostile actors change tactics. Preparedness is measured not by the sophistication of analysis alone, but by the ability to translate that analysis into timely and effective action.

A further priority identified in Tirana was the closer integration of candidate countries into Europe's democratic resilience architecture. The discussions challenged the traditional distinction between providers and recipients of expertise. Countries engaged in the enlargement process increasingly possess practical experience gained through responding to hybrid threats, protecting elections and strengthening democratic institutions under sustained external pressure.

Their contribution therefore extends beyond regulatory alignment. Candidate countries offer operational knowledge that can strengthen Europe's collective preparedness. Integrating them more systematically into European networks, training programmes, analytical exchanges and operational cooperation would enhance resilience across the continent while reinforcing the strategic dimension of enlargement itself.

While implementation was the central focus of the discussions, participants also reaffirmed that operational capability ultimately depends on resilient democratic societies. Governments alone cannot safeguard the integrity of the information environment. Universities, research institutes, independent media, fact-checking organisations, civil society and technology companies all contribute expertise that complements institutional action.

Media literacy, strategic communication and civic education remain essential components of resilience, not as isolated policy initiatives but as part of a broader effort to strengthen democratic confidence and reduce societal vulnerabilities. Likewise, artificial intelligence should be viewed neither as a solution nor as a threat in itself. It is an increasingly important tool that can both accelerate influence operations and improve detection, analysis and early warning. The decisive factor remains the capacity of democratic institutions to use these technologies responsibly, transparently and effectively.

The discussions in Tirana reflected an important evolution in the European debate. The priority is no longer to define the challenge of FIMI or to establish its strategic relevance. Europe has already laid many of the necessary foundations. The task ahead is to ensure that existing frameworks deliver practical results through stronger coordination, deeper cooperation and sustained institutional capability.

Turning strategy into capability will require continuous political commitment, investment in expertise and a willingness to share experience across borders. In this next phase, implementation becomes the true measure of democratic resilience. Europe will be strongest not when it creates the greatest number of new initiatives, but when it enables the institutions, partnerships and instruments it has already built to function as a coherent and effective system.

The Tirana Message

The Tirana Conference marked an important step in Albania's engagement with FIMI. As the first international conference on this subject, it brought the enlargement perspective into a European debate that is becoming central to democratic security.

The conference did not seek to negotiate formal conclusions. Nevertheless, the discussions revealed strong convergence around a practical agenda for action.

1. Treat democratic resilience as a security priority

FIMI is not simply a media or communications issue. It is used to influence political processes, exploit social divisions and weaken trust in democratic institutions. National and European security policies should therefore address the protection of the information environment alongside military, economic and cyber security.

2. Protect trust, not only information

The ultimate target of manipulation is often not a particular fact, but public confidence itself. Exposing falsehoods remains necessary, but it is not enough. Transparent institutions, accountable government, credible public communication and independent journalism are the foundations of lasting resilience.

3. Build preparedness before crises emerge

Resilience cannot be assembled during an election, cyberattack or geopolitical crisis. Governments should establish clear responsibilities, trained teams, reliable communication channels and trusted partnerships in advance. Preparedness should be a permanent function of democratic governance, supported beyond individual political and electoral cycles.

4. Turn knowledge into capability

Europe has developed a sophisticated understanding of FIMI. The priority now is implementation. This requires stronger coordination, improved analytical and early-warning capabilities, specialised training and closer links between those who investigate influence operations and those who make policy. Analytical capacity should also include deeper political and historical expertise on the systems that generate influence operations, not only technical monitoring of the narratives and methods they produce.

5. Integrate candidate countries into European cooperation

Candidate countries should be more closely associated with EU initiatives, operational networks, training and information-sharing. Their exposure to hybrid threats provides experience that can strengthen European preparedness. Enlargement should therefore be recognised not only as a process of integration, but also as an investment in Europe's security and resilience.

6. Make resilience a whole-of-society endeavour

No institution can protect the democratic information environment alone. Governments, parliaments, independent media, academia, civil society, fact-checkers, technology companies and citizens have different but complementary responsibilities. Permanent cooperation between them is an operational necessity, not an optional addition.

7. Invest in citizens' capacity to navigate information

Media literacy and critical thinking should be treated as essential civic skills. Education should help citizens assess sources, recognise manipulation and understand how digital platforms shape the information they receive. A well-informed society is harder to deceive and less vulnerable to polarisation.

8. Use technology without relying on it

Artificial intelligence will increase the speed, scale and sophistication of influence operations. It can also strengthen analysis, detection and early

warning. European institutions and governments should develop these capabilities responsibly, with appropriate transparency and safeguards. Technology can support resilience, but it cannot replace trusted institutions or informed citizens.

9. Strengthen cooperation across borders

Foreign influence operations move easily between languages, platforms and jurisdictions. European responses must be equally connected through regular exchanges of analysis, joint training and professional networks linking EU institutions, Member States, candidate countries and democratic partners. These networks should also draw systematically on democratic actors and independent experts with first-hand knowledge of authoritarian systems, whose insights can help identify emerging narratives, proxy networks and methods of audience targeting.

10. Defend democracy democratically

Measures against FIMI must remain anchored in freedom of expression, pluralism, independent journalism, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights. The purpose is not to make democratic societies less open, but to enable them to remain open while becoming more resilient.

Conclusion

The Tirana Conference confirmed that the European debate on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference has entered a new phase. The challenge is no longer to recognise the threat, but to translate shared understanding into coordinated action.

For Albania, hosting this conference reflected a commitment not only to strengthen its own democratic resilience, but also to contribute to a broader European effort. As a NATO Ally and EU candidate country, Albania stands ready to help shape a more resilient, better connected and more prepared Europe.

Ultimately, democratic resilience is measured not by the absence of interference, but by the strength of the institutions, partnerships and values that enable democracy to endure.

Programme and Bios of the panellists

09:15 – 09:30 | Opening Session

Welcoming remarks - **H.E. Mr. Ferit Hoxha**, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs

Keynote Address - **H.E. Mr. Edi Rama**, Prime Minister of Albania

09:30 – 10:50 | Panel I: FIMI in Europe: The New Frontline of European Security

This panel will provide an overview of FIMI as an increasingly important hybrid threat to democratic societies, clarifying the distinctions between misinformation, disinformation, and coordinated foreign influence operations. It will examine how foreign actors exploit digital platforms, artificial intelligence, coordinated inauthentic behaviour, and cross-platform information campaigns to manipulate public discourse and undermine democratic institutions. Drawing on the experience of European institutions, NATO, enlargement partners, and leading international experts, the discussion will examine how democratic societies are responding to the growing challenge of foreign information manipulation and interference. It will explore the European Union's evolving policy framework, including the European Democracy Shield and the FIMI Toolbox, while highlighting practical approaches to strengthening democratic resilience through institutional cooperation, independent media, academic research, and civil society.

Moderator: Mr. Miroslav Sazdovski - Senior Analyst, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats

1. **Mr. David Colon** - Professor, Sciences Po Paris, leading expert on FIMI
2. **Mr. Andy Pryce** (VTC) - Senior Fellow, Center for European Policy Analysis
3. **Mr. Uldis Elksnītis** - Strategic Communication Officer, DG COMM, European Commission
4. **Mr. David Satter** (VTC) – Journalist, historian and former senior fellow of the Hudson Institute and the Johns Hopkins University
5. **Ms. Natalia Arno** - President and Founder of Free Russia Foundation.

Q&A

11:10 – 12:30 | Panel II: Albania, enlargement and FIMI: vulnerabilities, preparedness and practical responses

This panel will examine the Albanian information environment and its resilience to an increased foreign information manipulation environment. It will explore the country's evolving media and social media ecosystem, patterns of information consumption, and the impact of online polarization on democratic discourse. Building on this foundation, the discussion will assess how foreign actors are or may seek to exploit domestic political tensions through coordinated influence campaigns, state-sponsored media, distorted narratives, inauthentic online behaviour and artificial intelligence in targeted disinformation campaigns. The panel will also discuss practical measures to strengthen democratic resilience, protect public debate, and safeguard Albania's democratic institutions against foreign information manipulation.

Moderator: Mr. Remzi Lani – Executive Director of Media Institute, Albania

1. **Mr. Richard Kuchta** - Senior Analyst on the ISD Germany team
2. **Mr. Valeriu Pasa** - Chairman, WatchDog.MD Community
3. **Mr. Bohdan Nahaylo** - Chief Editor at Kyiv Post
4. **Ms. Iris Luarasi** - Member of Parliament, Subcommittee on Public Information Integrity and Disinformation
5. **Ms. Klodiana Kapo** - Executive Director of Faktoje.al

Q&A

12:30 – 12:40 | Closing Remarks. H.E. Mr. Ferit Hoxha, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania

About the speakers:

Panel I: FIMI in Europe: The New Frontline of European Security

Miroslav Sazdovski

Senior Analyst, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats

Miroslav Sazdovski is a Senior Analyst at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, where he focuses on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), hybrid threats and strategic communications. His work supports NATO and EU Allies in understanding and responding to information threats, with particular emphasis on democratic resilience, resilience-building and the evolving information environment. He regularly contributes to international research, training and policy discussions on countering malign influence and strengthening institutional preparedness against hybrid challenges.

David Colon

Professor, Sciences Po Paris

David Colon is Professor at Sciences Po Paris and one of Europe's leading scholars on the history of propaganda, media and information warfare. He is the author of several acclaimed books, including *Propagande* and *La Guerre de l'information*, and serves on the Steering Committee of the World Economic Forum's Global Future Council on Information Integrity. His research explores the evolution of influence operations, strategic communication and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), combining historical perspective with contemporary security challenges. He regularly advises public institutions and international organisations on information resilience and democratic security.

Andy Pryce (VTC)

Senior Fellow, Center for European Policy Analysis

Andy Pryce is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), specialising in European security, Russian influence operations and democratic resilience. A former senior official in the UK Government, he has extensive experience in national security, strategic communications and countering hostile state activity. His work focuses on helping governments and institutions understand and respond to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), hybrid threats and the evolving security challenges facing Europe and the transatlantic community.

Uldis Elksnītis

Strategic Communication Officer, DG COMM, European Commission

Uldis Elksnītis works as an information and communications officer for the European Commission's Task Force for Strategic Communications and Countering Information Manipulation, currently focusing on delivering tangible results under the European Democracy Shield, especially on building democratic resilience and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). He has previously served as a seconded national expert on strategic communications at the European External Action Service's East StratCom Task Force, developing the EUvsDisinfo platform and focusing on understanding Russia as a FIMI threat actor. Prior to joining the EU institutions, Uldis accrued a decade of diplomatic

experience working on a broad range of security policy issues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and the Delegation of Latvia to NATO.

David Satter (VTC)

Journalist and Author

David Satter is an American journalist, historian and author widely recognised as one of the foremost Western experts on Russia and the Soviet Union. A former Moscow correspondent for the Financial Times and Radio Liberty, he has spent nearly five decades analysing Russian politics, authoritarianism and information manipulation. He is the author of six books on Russia and continues to contribute to leading international publications on Russian affairs, democracy and political influence.

Natalia Arno

President and Founder, Free Russia Foundation

Natalia Arno is President and Founder of the Free Russia Foundation, an international organisation dedicated to promoting democracy, civil society and human rights in Russia and across the wider region. She is widely recognised for her work on democratic resilience, Russian influence operations and support for democratic actors living under authoritarian regimes. Through her leadership, the Foundation has become a leading voice on countering Kremlin influence and strengthening transatlantic cooperation in support of democratic values.

Panel II: Albania, enlargement and FIMI: vulnerabilities, preparedness and practical responses

Remzi Lani

Executive Director of Media Institute

Remzi Lani is one of Albania's most distinguished media experts, analysts and public intellectuals. Founder of the Albanian Media Institute, he has spent more than three decades working on media development, democratic governance, freedom of expression and strategic communication across the Western Balkans. He has advised numerous international organisations and regularly contributes to debates on media resilience, disinformation and democratic transformation in Southeast Europe.

Richard Kuchta

Senior Analyst, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD Germany)

Richard Kuchta is a Senior Analyst at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD Germany), specialising in online extremism, information operations and digital platform regulation. His work combines digital investigations with policy analysis, focusing on emerging influence campaigns, platform governance and the implementation of the EU Digital Services Act. He regularly presents his research to European institutions, governments and civil society organisations working on democratic resilience and countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI).

Valeriu Paşa

Chairman, WatchDog.MD Community

Valeriu Paşa is Chairman of the WatchDog.MD Community, one of Moldova's leading public policy think tanks. A recognised expert on strategic communication, elections and countering disinformation, he has led nationwide initiatives to strengthen societal resilience against foreign information manipulation and interference. He has also contributed to the development of Moldova's National Security Strategy and the establishment of the country's Centre for Strategic Communication.

Bohdan Nahaylo

Chief Editor, Kyiv Post

Bohdan Nahaylo is Chief Editor of the Kyiv Post and a British-Ukrainian journalist with more than four decades of experience covering the Soviet Union, Ukraine and international affairs. A former senior official with the United Nations and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, he is widely recognised for his expertise on Russian information operations, Ukraine's resilience and the role of independent media during conflict.

Iris Luarasi

Member of Parliament, Chair of the Subcommittee on Public Information Integrity and Disinformation

Iris Luarasi is a Member of the Albanian Parliament and Chair of the Subcommittee on Public Information Integrity and Disinformation. A former academic, journalist and civil society leader, she has long worked on media, education and democratic participation. She currently leads parliamentary efforts aimed at strengthening Albania's institutional response to disinformation and protecting the integrity of the public information space.

Klodiana Kapo

Executive Director, Faktoje

Klodiana Kapo is Executive Director of Faktoje, Albania's first independent fact-checking organisation and a member of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network and the International Fact-Checking Network. An experienced journalist and media manager, she leads initiatives to strengthen media accountability, fact-checking and public resilience against disinformation while promoting professional standards in journalism.